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Abstract 
In the Reality we know, we cannot say if something is infinite whether we are doing Physics, Biology, 
Sociology or Economics. This means we have to be careful using this concept. Infinite structures do not 
exist in the physical world as far as we know. So what do mathematicians mean when they assert the 
existence of (the mathematical symbol for the set of all integers)? There is no universally accepted 
philosophy of mathematics but the most common belief is that mathematics touches on another worldly 
absolute truth. Many mathematicians believe that mathematics involves a special perception of an 
idealized world of absolute truth. This comes in part from the recognition that our knowledge of the 
physical world is imperfect and falls short of what we can apprehend with mathematical thinking. The 
objective of this paper is to present an epistemological rather than an historical vision of the mathematical 
concept of infinity that examines the dialectic between the actual and potential infinity. 
 
 
Keywords: Actual infinity, Coincidentia oppositorum, Limit, Paradoxes, Succession, Potential infinity, 
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“The infinite has always stirred the 
emotions of mankind more deeply than 
any other question; the infinite has 
stimulated and fertilized reason as a few 
other ideas have” (D. Hilbert) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Infinity is not an easy concept. For (Manfreda Kolar, V.& Hodnik Čadež, T., 2012) a 
number of difficulties that people cope with when dealing with infinity include its 
abstract nature, the well-known paradoxes, and understanding infinity as an ongoing 
process which never ends, or as a set of an infinite number of elements. Infinity can be 
understood in several often seemingly incompatible ways, and involve value judgments 
or assumptions that are neither explicit nor desired. In what follows we distinguish 
several aspects, some potential, others actual and some teleological. Historically there 
were theological and mystical interpretations to the infinite (Restivo, 1963)1. Another 
                                                          
1For Jewish mysticism, the Infinity, Ein-Sof, the infinite God, has no static definable form. Instead, the 
Kabbalists conceive God, the world and humanity as evolving together through, and thus embodying, a 
number of distinct stages and aspects, with later stages opposing but at the same time encompassing 
earlier ones. The Kabbalist’s God is both perfectly simple and infinitely complex, nothing and everything, 
hidden and revealed, reality and illusion, creator of man and created by man. As Ein-Sof evolves it is 
progressively revealed as “nothing whatsoever” (Ayin), the totality of being, the Infinite Will 
(Ratzon).Some Jewish writing (Kaplan 1990; Saks 1990,  2002; Schochet, 1979) refers to different levels 
of infinite spiritual worlds, an idea similar to Georg Cantor’s idea that there is an infinite sequence of 
(mathematical) infinities: ℵ0<ℵ1<ℵ2< …. . Cantor’s demonstration that the infinite cube contains exactly 
the same number of points as the one-inch cube helps to understand “the paradox of God’s simultaneous 
transcendence and immanence.”  
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interpretation attributes infinity to Reality. Words implying all or any may be used 
synonymously with the infinite: every man, every triangle... However, there is a 
difference between these terms. The first refers to all men (who have existed and will 
exist) and is finite while the second, the number of triangles is not finite. Another aspect 
of the idea that we are trying to refine and specify is the concept very small. We 
consider that the very small is related to the very large, for obvious reasons. If big arises 
through a process of accumulation of one more iteratively (stacking), reverse the 
process countless times and the result will be small by shrinking.  
In economic terms this feature could be equated with the property required by the 
economists of the school of Lausanne, thin divisibility. On the negative side we would 
have zero, not a negative infinite but an interpretation of a trend and the reverse of the 
growth path. Cognitive scientist George Lakoff  (Lakoff & Nuñez, 2000) considers the 
concept of infinity in mathematics and the sciences as a metaphor. This perspective is 
based on the basic metaphor of infinity (BMI), defined as the ever-increasing sequence 
<1,2,3,...>. Perspective artwork utilizes the concept of imaginary vanishing points, 
or points at infinity, located at an infinite distance from the observer. This allows artists 
to create paintings that realistically render space, distances, and forms (Kline, 1985). 
We should distinguish two aspects. One is the negative infinite, that represents the lack 
of something and this absence is glaringly and increasingly demanding and painful. 
Another aspect would be zero, the total absence of all being (understood in its broadest 
sense, as a way to exist) or any quality. These "concepts" are often misunderstood, as 
the total lack of goodness can be equated with total depravity, but they are different 
concepts, not having one does not mean having otherwise and not to be beautiful does 
not mean to be ugly. 
The idea of the infinite seems difficult to grasp, because, at first sight, it is beyond all 
human experience. The human mind is accustomed to dealing with finite things, 
reflected in finite ideas. Everything has a beginning and an end. This is a familiar 
thought. But what is familiar is not necessarily true. The history of mathematical 
thought has some highly instructive lessons on this score. For a long time, 
mathematicians, at least in Europe, sought to banish the concept of infinity. Their 
reasons for so doing are obvious enough. Apart from the evident difficulty in 
conceptualizing infinity, in purely mathematical terms it involves a contradiction. 
Mathematics deals with definite magnitudes. Infinity by its very nature cannot be 
counted or measured. This means that there is a real conflict between the two. For that 
reason, the great mathematicians of ancient Greece avoided infinity like the plague. 
Despite this, from the beginnings of philosophy, men speculated about infinity. 
Anaximander (610-547 B.C.) took it as the basis of his philosophy. In ancient Greek the 
term apeiron meant endless, unlimited, infinite, the unlimited or lacking definition, or 
without measure. Therefore, one could interpret the apeiron as indicating ethical chaos. 
Euclid avoided using the word infinite in its elements, saying "there is an infinite 
amount of... ". He preferred to use the phrase "an amount greater than any given". The 
Socratics associated the idea of infinite to something bad and evil. The infinite was not 
only huge, enormously large and indefinite, but was associated with the negative idea of 
disorder of chaos, the imperfect. Zeno’s paradoxes (Huggett, 2010a,b) do not prove that 
movement is an illusion, or that Achilles, in practice, will not overtake the tortoise, but 
they do reveal brilliantly the limitations of the kind of thinking now known as formal 
logic. The attempt to eliminate all contradiction from reality, as the Eleatics did, 
inevitably leads to this kind of insoluble paradox, or antinomy, as Kant later called it. In 
order to prove that a line could not consist of an infinite number of points, Zeno claimed 
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that, if it were really so, then Achilles would never overtake the tortoise. There really is 
a logical problem here. As Alfred Hooper explains (Woods & Grant, 2003, pp. 151): 
"This paradox still perplexes even those who know that it is possible to find the sum of 
an infinite series of numbers forming a geometrical progression whose common ratio is 
less than 1, and whose terms consequently become smaller and smaller and thus 
‘converge’ on some limiting value."  
In fact, Zeno had uncovered a contradiction in mathematical thought which would have 
to wait two thousand years for a solution. The contradiction relates to the use of the 
infinite. In the interpretation of classical mathematics the notion of limit (potential 
infinite) has been applied to the sum of the terms of a indefinitely decreasing geometric 
series giving a finite result for a sum of infinite terms (actual infinity). This is a 
contradiction. In our view, the reason for this contradiction lies in the assumption that 
we make as mathematicians, that in an indefinitely decreasing series, the term infinite 
reaches the (potential infinite) limit, or rather, that when we approach this limit, the 
value of rn becomes negligible. This is only justified if it were a practical measurement, 
since then, much as the measure is fine in the end, the measuring device is not able to 
record an infinitesimal increase in magnitude. However, the geometric space consists of 
infinite points, from which it follows that no amount, no matter how small, can be 
neglected, and Zeno's paradox lies precisely in this mathematical quality. So the 
assumption that we can approach infinity and it is not worth taking into consideration 
the value of rn, is opposite to the presumption that Zeno makes in his aporia, since, 
according to the Eleatics, the distance between Achilles and the Tortoise is always a 
geometrically straight segment, nn rdd 0= , which by definition contains infinite points 
(actual infinity). Thus, if we remain faithful to Zeno’s thought, the final conclusion is 
that it is rationally impossible to reach infinity, this is only possible when 0=nr . As 
long as infinity not reached, we will, as Zeno says, have an infinite number of points 
(actual infinity) between Achilles’ and the Tortoise’s location. Then if actual infinity 
seems to be a property of rational thought, the notion of a limit (potential infinite) 
appears to be a mathematical concession to the world of the senses, a concession that 
would seriously upset Zeno, who believed that rationality prevails over the senses. 
From Pythagoras right up to the discovery of the differential and integral calculus in the 
17th century, mathematicians went to great lengths to avoid the use of the concept of 
infinity. Only the great genius Archimedes approached the subject, but still avoided it 
by using a roundabout method. The early atomists, starting with Leukippus, who may 
have been a pupil of Zeno, stated that the atoms "indivisible and infinite in number, 
move about ceaselessly in empty space, of infinite extent." The greatest of Greek 
mathematicians, Archimedes (287-212 B.C.) made effective use of indivisibles in 
geometry, but considered the idea of infinitely large and small as being without logical 
foundation. Likewise, Aristotle argued that, since a body must have form, it must be 
bounded, and therefore cannot be infinite. While accepting that there were two kinds of 
"potential" infinities—successive addition in arithmetic (infinitely large), and 
successive subdivision in geometry (infinitely small)—he nevertheless polemicised 
against geometers who held that a line segment is composed of infinitely many fixed 
infinitesimals, or indivisibles [see section 3]. This denial of the infinite constituted a real 
barrier to the development of classical Greek mathematics. By contrast, the Indian 
mathematicians had no such scruples and made great advances, which, via the Arabs 
later entered Europe.  
For Dionysios the Areopagite there is no intellectual concept that can cover all features 
of God’s infinity (actual infinite). Thus, he created apophatic theology in which all 
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attempts to specify God’s infinity are in vain. God is always ontologically (υπερουσιος) 
and epistemologically beyond the way humans think about Him.  
The attempt to banish contradiction from thought, in accordance with the rigid schemas 
of formal logic held back the development of mathematics. But the adventurous spirit of 
the Renaissance opened men’s minds to new possibilities which were, in truth, infinite. 
In his book The New Science (1638), Galileo pointed out that every integer (whole 
number) has only one perfect square, and every perfect square is the square of only one 
positive integer. Thus, in a sense, there are just as many perfect squares as there are 
positive integers. This immediately leads us into a logical contradiction. It contradicts 
the axiom that the whole is greater than any of its parts, inasmuch as not all the positive 
integers are perfect squares, and all the perfect squares form part of all the positive 
integers. 
When mathematicians, speaking about infinite sets, use the expression, "all but a finite 
number of members," they are saying that the infinite "all" is still the same size "all" 
even if we take away some finite set. The removal of billions of members from an 
infinite set in no way diminishes its infinity. The least that can be said is that the infinity 
of the mathematicians supplies us with a useful metaphor: many of the assertions we 
make about God and about a mathematical infinity are similar. Modern physics accepts 
that the number of instants between two seconds is infinite, just as the number of 
instants in a span of time with neither beginning nor end. The universe itself consists of 
an infinite chain of cause and effect, ceaselessly changing, moving and developing. This 
has nothing in common with the crude and one-sided notion of infinity contained in the 
infinite series of numbers in simple arithmetic, in which "infinity" always "starts" with 
the number one. 
This is only one of the numerous paradoxes which have plagued mathematics ever since 
the Renaissance when men began to subject their thoughts and assumptions to a critical 
analysis. As a result of this, slowly, and in the teeth of stubborn resistance from 
conservative minds, one by one the supposedly unassailable axioms and "eternal truths" 
of mathematics have been overthrown. It seems likely that only in the realm of pure 
mathematics can the idea of infinity be entertained. In the context of actual, manifest, 
realizable quantities things seem much more like the situation in a computer where all 
phenomena have definite resolution and size. One can never create an infinitely large 
file because that would require an infinite amount of time and infinite computational 
resources such as memory. Even with the domain of pure mathematics, infinities can 
only exist because they are symbolically represented and never actually represented. No 
one has ever written out an infinite number of integers thereby actually representing the 
set of integers. It is only ever referred to but never fully represented. If one required sets 
to be fully represented then mathematics could not operate on actual infinite sets; it 
could only operate on potentially infinite sets which always have finite representations 
(e.g., {1,2,3,…}) but which are unlimited in their length. Such sets are arbitrarily large 
but always have a definite finite size. Modern mathematics is totally dependent upon the 
assumed existence of actual infinities but the existence of these can neither be proven 
nor disproven by mathematics. This leaves modern mathematicians in the position of 
defending their belief in the existence of actual infinities and discrediting any opposing 
ideas, but beside all of this - do actual infinites exist? All the evidence seems to suggest 
that they only exist within the context of modern mathematics, which would seem to 
suggest that modern mathematics should return to its axioms and see where the problem 
arises. 
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We arrive at the point where the entire edifice has been shown to be unsound and in 
need of a thoroughgoing reconstruction on more solid, yet more flexible foundations, 
which are already in the process of being laid, and which will inevitably imply belief. 
 
2. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The concept of infinity from a philosophical perspective has been widely discussed as it 
leads to contradictions and paradoxes, from Euclid (the whole is not greater than the 
parts), Zeno's paradox (how does one halve the infinite in finite time?)2 or Russell (the 
set of sets that do not belong to itself) or the Hilbert Hotel3. In the seventeenth century, 
in what might be called the modern world, the idea was introduced of considering that 
the finite and the infinite are governed by different laws and precepts. John Wallis, in 
the seventeenth century introduced the symbol of infinity. Wallace may have been 
inspired by the Roman M which evolved from the earlier Etruscan symbol for 1000 
resembling the lemniscate, as never ending lines. "Coincidentally" this symbol is used 
in the Tarot, designating perpetual motion. This letter is associated with the first letter 
of the Hebrew alphabet ℵ, used later by Cantor, who also related the idea of the infinite 
with God. Although attempts have been made to separate, or link, the infinite with 
certain ethical ideas, this has not been achieved completely and reappears in a cyclical 
manner. Examples are the considerations of S. Augustine and St. Tomas, for whom the 
infinite was a challenge to the One that could be considered infinite, that is, God. 
The inclusion of the Potential infinity for the finite is a primordial characteristic of the 
concept as it emphasizes that continua are indefinitely divisible. 
                                                          
2Zeno's paradoxes are a set of philosophical problems generally thought to have been devised 
by Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (ca. 490–430 BC) to support Parmenides's doctrine that contrary to 
the evidence of one's senses, the belief in plurality and change is mistaken, and in particular that motion is 
nothing but an illusion. It is usually assumed, based on Plato's Parmenides (128a-d), that Zeno took on 
the project of creating these paradoxes because other philosophers had created paradoxes using 
Parmenides's ideas. Thus Plato has Zeno say the purpose of the paradoxes "is to show that their 
hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the 
hypothesis that they are one." (Parmenides 128d). Plato has Socrates claim that Zeno and Parmenides 
were essentially arguing exactly the same point (Parmenides 128a-b). Some of Zeno's nine surviving 
paradoxes (preserved in Aristotle's Physics and Simplicius's commentary thereon) are essentially 
equivalent to one another. Aristotle offered a refutation of some of them. Three of the strongest and most 
famous—that of Achilles and the tortoise, the Dichotomy argument, and that of an arrow in flight—are 
presented in detail below. Zeno's arguments are perhaps the first examples of a method of proof 
called reductio ad absurdum also known as proof by contradiction. They are also credited as a source of 
the dialectic method used by Socrates. 
 
3Consider a hypothetical hotel with a countably infinite number of rooms, all of which are occupied. One 
might be tempted to think that the hotel would not be able to accommodate any newly arriving guests, as 
would be the case with a finite number of rooms. It is also possible to accommodate a countably 
infinite number of new guests: just move the person occupying room 1 to room 2, the guest occupying 
room 2 to room 4, and, in general, the guest occupying room n to room 2n, and all the odd-numbered 
rooms (which are countably infinite) will be free for the new guests. It is possible to accommodate 
countably infinitely many coach loads of countably infinite passengers each, by several different methods. 
Most methods depend on the seats in the coaches being already numbered (alternatively, the hotel 
manager must have the axiom of countable choice at his or her disposal). In general any pairing function 
can be used to solve this problem. For each of these methods, consider a passenger's seat number on a 
coach to be , and their coach number to be , and the numbers  and  are then fed into the two 
arguments of the pairing function. 
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Example 1: The division of a segment of a line in disjointed parts is endless and the 
Potential infinity of these parts is enclosed within the segment. 
 
That infinite Spinoza (2007) called the "infinity of reason", a suitable word as it raises 
the dignity of the concept. Whereas merely potential infinity, the divergent sequences, 
devoid of limit, Spinoza referred to as "the infinite of imagination", and it also appears 
judicious if one serves the operating mind, to be able to access such an infinite, and 
serves as much for imaginative representations inside of "mental space" as for analytical 
reasoning. The problem of potential knowledge of finitude, of its relationship with 
infinity is important as a foundation and condition of understanding possibility and 
potentiality. These are attitudes that the knowing subject can assume before 
disappearing under the shadow of the topic that Hegel (1990) recognized as crucial in 
this dialectical struggle, namely between infinity actu (actual infinity) and the cognitive 
attitude appropriate to understand it. However, infinite divergences are unleashed from 
the knowledge of the finite, with the obvious goal of the search for truth that involves, 
in effect, something deeper and more radical such as the definition of the relationship 
between finitude and infinity and, therefore, two opposing fundamental ideas 
concerning infinity. This, in turn, is the true touchstone of this debate, beginning with 
Spinoza, and extending its validity to all thought of modern times. 
Hegel denounces the background fallacy of the Jacobian vision (Jacobi, 1980) in the 
confusion between the empirical infinitum (imaginative) and infinite actu in Spinoza, 
clarifying on the one hand, the characteristics and the fundamental role of the first 
infinite and, on the other, the essence of substance, making it indivisible, truthful and 
understanding, i.e., also of the particular or finite. This is probably the biggest 
difference between infinitum actu, that Spinoza defines as the "absolute affirmation of 
the existence of some nature and on the contrary the finite is its partial denial" 
(Spinoza, 2007), and the infinite empirical finite, sum of the individual, namely, for 
each of the subdivisions of the substance that appear exclusively absolute in the eyes of 
the Imaginatio (Hegel compares with reflective attitude of modern Verstand). The sum 
of the infinite negations of substance (the ordo rerum et connectio), the result of 
abstraction and hypostatizing by Reflection, is opposed to infinity which, in turn, 
becomes something "partially" denied. This attitude is the result of imaginative 
rapprochement, the typical approach of reflective dualistic philosophy which puts one as 
what is not what the other is, each thing at the same time in and for itself given as 
another, accordingly a string of denials made positive by imagination. The infinite actu, 
however, resolves this opposition in itself. The eternal, Hegel argues, is the absolute 
identity of the two (finite and infinite) which exceeds the absolute contradiction of 
empirical infinity itself, annihilating the opposition (finite/infinite) and the abstractions 
produced by Imaginatio. 
It is fundamentally here that two different versions of the transcendent face each other: 
the traditional, proposing infinity as radically regarding the finite in its essence is 
concerned with establishing instantable opposition, and a new, original, where finite and 
infinite are no longer opposed. In the infinite the infinite series of finite modes of the 
substance, or its conditions, is collected and annulled in its apparently objective 
consistency. 
1) The first vision corresponds with a qualitative incommunicability between finite 
and infinite (which for Jacobi are the natural world and God (Jacobi, 1980)) in 
which the only bridge to exceed that call Schranken (bearing in mind the 
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Kantian distinction between Grenz and Schranke) is constituted by faith or, 
rather, by the famous somersault (Kant, 2002). 
2) The second perspective, on the other hand, could be defined as reconciliation, in 
which the finite is not required to consider a radically other, but through an 
itinerary that could define gnoseolgical and certainly epistemological (from 
Imaginatio to Amor Dei intellectualis understood as looking from a high 
sensitivity to looking from the point of view of substance), may be recognized as 
resolved within the everything-finite. 
As for the criticism of the confusion that would supposedly follow from Jacobi’s two 
infinities or better, between these two approaches on Spinozian infinity, Hegel points to 
Jacobi's intention to attribute to Spinozan thought the concept of an empirical infinity 
strictly related to the absolutism of the finite. 
This debate about the doctrine of Spinoza is a casus belli that Hegel uses to resolve 
important issues of his time and definitely made progress confronting some of the 
famous personalities and traditional philosophical views of the time. With this objective 
and aware of the value and weight that comes with pronouncing on these matters Hegel 
uses the celebrated and debated geometric-mathematical example that Spinoza used to 
clarify the idea of infinitum actu. This example, which Hegel interprets and attacks 
Jacobi, is called Letter on the Infinite, because it explicitly clarifies the Spinozian 
difference between infinitum actu and infinite empirical or imagination (Edition by 
Paulus (1802-1803). In this letter, sent to Meyer on 20 April 1663 to clarify the essence 
and nature of infinitum actu, Spinoza uses an example that Jacobi considered 
questionable asserting that here Spinoza himself would have been misled by their own 
imagination (Jacobi, 1996). 
 
3. THE MATHEMATICAL INFINITY 
 
The problem of two mathematical infinities, the potential and the actual has divided 
schools from the time of ancient Greece. Aristotle in his Physics, gives an idea of the 
state of the discussion at that time. Our renewed confrontation among mathematicians 
as well as philosophers is due to Cantor with his theory of transfinite numbers, and new 
algorithmic forms of old actual infinity. Included in the philosophical discussions are 
ethical considerations that associate the infinite with the bad or, at least, with the 
uncanny (a view that still stands). These were overcome by distinguishing between 
actual and potential infinity. 
 
3.1. Potential infinity 
Potential infinity is an idea used in calculus. Potential infinity is characterized by the 
idea of one more. It represents a cumulative process. The fundamental idea of "the 
infinite" is that there is always one more (less), one behind (above). It should be noted 
that this conception of infinite indicates a trend, a behavior that never ends. Infinite 
potential can be considered as a teleological concept. Note that this idea is not about 
certain ethical principles of perfection. This conception of infinity corresponds to a 
teleological interpretation of the infinite. Indeed, teleology studies final causes and 
Potential infinity reaches towards the end, knowing that it will never come, because 
there is always more, whether numbers, steps, intervals... Infinite potential is linked to 
the repetition of a process that never ends, leading to many problems and paradoxes, 
from Achilles and the tortoise to Zeno, on the impossibility of movement (how to give 
infinite steps in a limited time?). This conception of the Potential infinity is flirting with 
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the idea of limit, or rather with the operation of passage to the limit. Note that both 
concepts exist only as a tendency, in potential, since the two are inaccessible, which 
means that the terms infinite and unlimited should not be regarded as synonymous. 
Potential infinity refers to a procedure that gets closer and closer to, but never quite 
reaches, an infinite end. For instance, the sequence of numbers 1, 2, 3, 4,...gets higher 
and higher, but it has no end; it never gets to infinity. Infinity is just an indication of a 
direction -- it's "somewhere off in the distance." Chasing this kind of infinity is like 
chasing a rainbow or trying to sail to the edge of the world -- you may think you see it 
in the distance, but when you get to where you thought it was, you see it is still further 
away. Geometrically, imagine an infinitely long straight line; then "infinity" is off at the 
"end" of the line. Analogous procedures are given by limits in calculus, whether they 
use infinity or not. For example, limx → 0 (sin x)/x = 1. This means that when we choose 
values of x that are closer and closer to zero, but never quite equal to zero, then (sin 
x)/x gets closer and closer to one. 
 
3.2. The actual infinity 
If we emphasize the "totality" of the concept of infinite as a unit, as one, we will have 
the current version of infinite. This idea corresponds to "that which no greater can be 
thought". Actual infinity is considered as a whole, such as the set of natural numbers, 
all, not some, but all of them. This conception of infinite arises when considering it as a 
unit. That is, we have (in the sense of unity) a "thing" that is infinitely large or 
numerous, as the natural numbers or numbers that are multiples of 11. We treat it as if it 
was an item that comes to pass over the limit. It appears when we have arrived, when 
we have the total. This idea creates difficulties because we do not have an infinite, but 
many, which is difficult to compare and ultimately for measurement. Having admitted 
the existence of actual infinity, as many mathematicians refused to such as Cauchy and 
Gauss, it is easy to show that we have several infinites, which means that some are 
different than others and, therefore, of different size. That is, we will have some more 
infinite than others. Intuitively, if we consider the multiples of 11 and natural numbers, 
both are infinite, but it "appears" that the former is 11 times smaller than the second, but 
both are infinitely large. In logical terms we could say that the second is contained in 
the first and, given the postulate of Euclid, which states that the whole is greater than 
the parts, both infinites should be different, but they are not, they are the same size. 
Cardinal is defined as the size of a set, and the cardinal of both sets is the same, as 
Cantor demonstrated. Cantor's argument is simple. Just make sure that you can establish 
a bijective correspondence4 between the set of natural numbers and the set of multiples 
of 11, so that these sets are equipollent (have the same cardinal number). It is just as we 
can number the points of a semicircle or the points of a straight line. This is the 
definition that St. Anselm used with the idea of God. 
Could one establish a bijective correspondence between real and rational numbers? It is 
therefore evident that the set of real numbers is not countable, while the set of rational is 
countable, so that the cardinals of both sets are different, that is, they are not 
equipollent. However, when we talk about natural numbers or points on a line, or a 
plane, or rational numbers or a Cantor set we are considering that each set is infinite, 
although their "sizes" are different (Tirosh, 1999; Tiroshand Tsamir, 1996). We need a 
definition for the size of these sets, the appeal to their number does not work, since, as 
                                                          
4 ( ) 11f : ; f n n→ = ⋅   
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noted, the same "numero" (name) is used to describe different sizes and therefore 
different sets. To avoid these difficulties we define the infinite saying that a set is 
infinite if we can establish a correspondence between it and some of it. This definition 
is consistent with the existence of different infinites. To demonstrate this we simply 
apply Cantor’s rule of the diagonal. Similarly it must not be concluded that when a set is 
contained in another set, the former is a lesser infinite. Consider the set of natural 
numbers and the even numbers. At first it may seem that there are twice as natural 
numbers of pairs. However, both sets have the same number of elements. This concept 
is clarified if size is understood as its cardinal set, so that other content set can have the 
same size as the first. In this sense the assumption that the whole is greater than the 
parts is broken. In "Euclidean" terms one could expand the postulate saying that the 
whole is greater than or equal to the parts. 
 
3.3. Cantorian axiomatic system 
It seems natural to ask if any two sets have or have not the same number of elements. 
For the case of finite sets, simply count the items in each set. But in the case of infinite 
sets, the answer depends on what is understood by sets with the same number of 
elements, i.e., equipotent. 
 
Definition 1 (Postulate of cardinal number): For any set X there exists an application 
k with domain X and such that if Y is another set to verify that .)()( YXYkXk ≈⇔=  
 
For each set X, the set image k (X) by the Tarski function k is usually represented by 
Card (X), or 
_
_
X  according to the notation created by Cantor and the two bars indicate 
the cardinal of X obtained by two successive abstractions: the nature of the elements of 
X and the order in which these sub-elements are in X. The postulate of Tarski, valid for 
sets is not essential in the sense that the cardinal can be elaborated later to the ordinal to 
defining the cardinal number with reference to the ordinal number. The interest in the 
suppression of this postulate comes mainly from aesthetics, and, secondarily, in that 
philosophers remain attached to the Cantorian work on order and not on his 
mathematical work (Cavailles, 1962). 
 
Definition 2: Card (X) is a cardinal number iff there is a set X such that 
)()( XCardXk =  
 
Definition 3:  
1) YXYCardXCard ≤⇔≤ )()(  
2) YXYCardXCard <⇔< )()(  
Cantor’s Theorem:  
__
_
)(xPX
−
≤ where 
_
)(xP
−
is the power set of X 
 
Definition 4: ( ) )()( YCardxCardYXCard +=∪ whenever .∅≠YX   
 
Denoting two cardinal numbers by a and b, then the above definition would have to be 
specified in the direction. "There are disjoint sets X, Y such that a = Card(X, b = 
Card(Y)) and cardinal YX ∪  would sum a + b". This cardinal sum would be 
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independent of the sets X and Y, provided that they take with them equipotent sets. For 
this independence the cardinal sum would be unique. 
 
Definition 5: ( ) )()( YCardxCardYXCard ⋅=×  
 
The first four postulates of Peano (1979) intend to found an order of succession, natural 
for Integers. However Russell (1903) objected that Peano defined only one type of order 
in any sequence that was "well-ordered" without repeating any terms, and indefinite. 
Here is an example of a sequence belonging to these types of 
order: ,....
4
3,
3
2,
2
1
222 It properly belongs to the order genre defined as a Peano 
series of natural integers, but it is also common to countless other sequences. As well, 
these postulates are not just quantitative: the order is a quality relationship. The amount 
that an integer expressed was not constructed by Peano, rather he was concerned with 
the postulates that define the quantitative relation of order >. Just then the integer is 
formed with its two poles, the qualitative or ordinal and quantitative or cardinal. Then it 
appears that the natural order was none other than the increasing quantities. The natural 
sequence forms an arithmetic progression, where each term is generated by the addition 
of a unit to its predecessor. As specification of categorical bipolarity quality-quantity, 
we can conjecture that ordering and cardinality are also bipolar, which, peculiarly, are 
involved mutually in comprehension. This is in fact demonstrating the reconstruction of 
Peano: the main postulate the adding states that if m + n = p, then the addition to m of 
the successor of n will result in the successor of p, therefore the natural ordering 
includes comprehension of cardinality and, reciprocally, such ordering comes at the end 
of the relation>and is essentially quantitative, cardinal. For this reason, in the 
presentation of the Peano, cardinality is separated from ordination that is tied up to a 
kind of general, abstract formulation, not characteristic of natural sequence of integers. 
Otherwise, we are aware that by implication the reciprocal, and the inseparability, is 
maintained in transfinite numbers: the various constituted theorems of cardinality are 
required to demonstrate completely the postulate of choice and even the well-ordering 
theorem and, conversely, two infinite sets of identical order types have the same 
cardinality. Nevertheless, the sequence of natural integers is used to represent the order 
of all other sequences of the same type, to number their terms, even if the predecessor 
exceeds the successor, and even if these terms are unconnected material objects, the 
quantitative comparison of which makes no sense. The usual discourse asserts that in 
this last the ordering operator is the integer itself; but this is falling into tautology. 
What is the most important pole, the ordinal or cardinal? Since the integers integrate 
real numbers which are not ordering operators, that alone justifies the choice in favor of 
the cardinal. While the specialized field of stream mathematics, integer or not, the real 
number is the most refined and therein lies much of its essence. It is also saying that if 
physical greatness are qualities that are quantified, then the pure numbers are quantities 
that are qualified, especially discrete integer amounts, discontinuous and real numbers 
that are continuous quantities. 
Cantor's ideas that some infinites were more infinite than others, in addition to creating 
this scandal this view led to the formalization and extension of certain concepts such as 
cardinality and ordinal. We will not delve into these concepts as they are well known. It 
is just the point out that the cardinal indicates the unordered set size. That is, ignoring 
the order. The set of natural numbers Cantor appointed with the name of ℵ0. The ordinal 
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we report for the size of the set when elements of it are well sorted. That is, all the non-
empty part has a minimal element. The first transfinite ordinal Cantor appointed it by ω. 
It is curious that the Jesuit paleontologist Teilhard de Chardin, also speaks in his works 
of the ω point, though in a different sense: theological. Once we have the first transfinite 
we obtain the following with nothing more than to add to it , so we getω + ,1 ω + 2,...,ω 
+ω = 2ω ,... ,...,ω.ω.ω.ω….Cantor asks and did not solve the problem of the continuum 
between ℵ0 the cardinal of integers and ℵ0the cardinal of real numbers. Should there be 
any intermediate cardinal? Gödel and Cohen showed that the continuum theory can be 
taken as true or not without affecting set theory. The actual infinity is not only 
paradoxical, but it is consistent, which will force us to make a review of the 
development, use and review of the concept of infinity. 
Now the door was open to the creation, and the naming, of a whole gamut of infinities, 
in fact, an infinity of infinities (Aczel. 2000). A new world of transfinite numbers was 
being created. In according to Graham and Kantor (2009) should we say, “the creation 
and the naming” of transfinite numbers or “the naming and the creation” of them? 
Which comes first? 
The axiomatic system chosen corresponds to the Neumann-Bernays-Gödel system 
modified by Morse. For the authors, this is the most important operating system for 
current Mathematics. For mathematical considerations we consulted the following 
authors: Bourbaki (2008), Cantor (1955), Denjoy (1949-1954), Fraenkel (1939, 1949, 
1953), Hausdorff (2005), Kamke (1950), Krivine (1969), Rubin (1967) and Supper 
(1960). Theorems, represented by T, do not include proofs, which are well known to 
mathematicians. 
To Cantor (1955) is due the following definition: The set A is equipotent to set B and is 
denoted by BA ≈ if there exists a function BAF →: injective and surjective. It has 
been demonstrated that the relationship between sets defined BA ≈  is an equivalence 
relation. On the basis of the natural number { },...3,2,1=N it is stated that if a set A is 
equipotent to the set of natural numbers N is called countable and is said to have the 
cardinal א0. Also, if a set is finite is also said to be countable and equipotent to a subset 
of N. If a set is infinite and is not equipotent to N it is said to be uncountable. The 
relation of equipotency between sets verifies the properties of a relation of equivalence. 
It seems then natural to consider the class of all equipotent sets with one given as a new 
object. This is the process that allows the creation of new objects and therefore new sets 
and mathematical structures. However, this consideration is confronted with certain 
difficulties. Thus, the equivalence relation must be defined in the "set of all sets", which 
is prohibited. This can be remedied by saying that is defined in its own class of all sets. 
Thus, the new object required to be in accordance with the equivalence relation itself, 
which is a set, but the establishment of this fact is only feasible accepting some kind of 
new postulate. From a pragmatic approach that is interesting, in the acceptance of this 
new postulate, each set is associated with a new set, the natural number, so verifying 
that it corresponds to equipotent sets with the same cardinal number. That is, what is 
important to know is how to manage the new object, and the rules that apply to it, rather 
than the search for the essence of this new object. It was Tarski that made it possible for 
this approach, valid for an intuitive theory in relation to axiomatic sets, to be accepted 
as a new postulate (Suppes, 1960). 
 
Definition 6: A set is said to be infinite when is not finite. A cardinal number is said to 
be infinite when it is not finite. 
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The natural numbers are a set N, also represented by ω . 
 
Postulate of Infinity: There is an infinite set. The finite cardinals constitute a set 
N. { }( )( )XYYXYYXX ⊂∪⇒⊂∀∧∈∅∃  
 
Dedekind’s Definition: The necessary and sufficient condition that a set is infinite is 
that it is equipotent to any of its parts. 
 
Finite sets have different properties from sets that are not finite. The definition given by 
Dedekind of an infinite set is based on equipotency of a set with its parts. And from this 
definition can be obtained the remaining properties. 
 
T1: All subsets of N are finite or equipotent to N. 
T2: All infinite sets contain a subset that is equipotent to N. 
 
Definition 7:  
1)A set is said countable when it is equipotent with N. 
2)A set X is at its most countable when it is finite or countable. 
3)A family of sets ( ) LiiX ∈  is said to be countable, if their index set L is 
countable. 
 
T3: All subsets of N are at their most countable. 
T4: All infinite sets contain a countable subset. 
T5: Any part of a countable set is at its most countable. 
T6:  
1) NNxN ≈  
2) If X and Y are countable, so also is .XxY  
T7: If ( ) LiiX ∈ is a countable family of countable sets, their union is also countable. 
T8: Q is countable. 
T9: If X is a countable set and n is a natural number 1≥n , then nX  is numerable. 
T10: If X is a countable set and n f is a surjective application of X in Y, then Y is at most 
numerable.  
T11: If X is infinite and Y numerable, then YX ∪  is equipotent with X when ever 
.∅=∩YX . 
 
The above theorems can be reformulated as propositions about natural numbers if we 
remember that the cardinal of natural numbers is designated by 0ℵ , as the first 
transfinite cardinal when 1+= aa ,or also, when there is an infinite set in the sense of 
the definition of Dedekind, such that its cardinal is .a  With the convention that n 
designates the cardinality of a countable set, we have the following propositions in 
cardinal language: 
 
T12: ,, Nnn ∈∀ with 0ℵ<n if n is finite. 
T13: ( )abba ≤∃∀ ,  
T14: 0
2
000 ℵ=ℵ=ℵ⋅ℵ  
T15:  
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1) 000 ℵ=ℵ+ℵ  
2) 00 ℵ=ℵ∑  
T16: ( ) 0ℵ=QCard  
T17: If 0≠a then .00 ℵ=ℵ
n  
T18: aa ≤+ℵ0  
T19: 020
ℵ≤ℵ  
T20: The set [ ]1,0  is uncountable. 
 
Definition 8: The sets that have the same power as [ ]1,0  are said to have the power of 
continuum and is denoted by c. 
 
4. THE HYPOTHESIS OF CONTINUUM 
 
Aristotle also analyzes the problem of the nature of a continuum ("continuum" being the 
Latin noun formed from the adjective "continuus", meaning joining, connected, 
uninterrupted or unbroken). Is a continuum, composed of indivisible elements or not? 
Most philosophers before Cantor, followed Aristotle in arguing that continuity was not 
composed of indivisible elements. In (Book V3 of the Physics) Aristotle defined various 
concepts including: Together, between, successor, contiguous and the concepts of 
continuous as a subdivision of the contiguous.  "Things are called continuous when the 
touching limits of each become one and the same - and are contained in each other.  
Continuity is impossible if these extremities are two".  In (Book VI.1 of the Physics) he 
argues that extremities of two points cannot be one, nor together. If the continuum 
consists of points, they should be in contact or continuous with each other. But if they 
are in contact, they will have different parts, while the continuum has different parts. 
Thus, the continuum is divisible only by parts that are infinitely divisible (231 b15). 
Using the Cantorian hypothesis of continuum: 
( ).2 00 ℵ<<ℵ∃ aa  
( ).0 caa <<ℵ∃  
we obtain the following theorems: 
T21: If ba <  then [ ] [ ].,1,0 ba≈  
T22: The intervals [ [ ] ] ] [1,0,1,0,1,0 have the same power as [ ]1,0  
T23: The set of real numbers R has the power of a continuum. 
T24: The power ( )NP of is c, e.g. 02ℵ=c  
T25: The union of an infinite succession of disjoint sets of the power of continuum has 
the power of a continuum. 
T26: .2 cccc ==⋅  
T27: ., Nnccn ∈∀=  
According to Fischbein et al. (1979) the world of ,...,, 210 ℵℵℵ is composed of actual 
infinity and represents a potential, not an actual form of infinity.  
Transfinite induction, like regular induction, is used to show a property )(nP and holds 
for all numbers n. The essential difference is that regular induction is restricted to the 
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natural numbers, which are precisely the finite ordinal numbers. The normal inductive 
step of deriving )1( +nP from )(nP  can fail due to the limits of ordinals. 
Let A be a well-ordered set and let )(xP  be a proposition with domain A. A proof by 
transfinite induction uses the following steps (Gleason 1991, Hajnal 1999): 
1. Demonstrate )0(P  is true. 
2. Assume )(bP  is true for ba <∀ . 
3. Prove )(aP , using the assumption in (2). 
4. Then )(aP  is true for Aa∈∀  . 
 
5. ACTUAL INFINITY AND COINCIDENTIA OPPOSITORUM: CUSANUS AND 
CANTOR 
 
Greek philosophy, before the Christian theologian Gregor of Nyssa, was oriented 
towards finiteness. St. Augustine in his Civitate Dei conceived God as being infinite, 
this is a break with Aristotle’s metaphysical concept of a finite God. This new concept 
of an infinite God raised the issue of how think about this infinity, which was 
inconceivable in classical Greek metaphysics. The theology of Dionysios the 
Areopagite and Gregor’s theology stresses the infinity of God. However, Dionysios 
argues that this infinite cannot be captured in language. This apophatic answer raises the 
intellectual challenge to think and relate to the infinity of God, yet it is so spiritually 
powerful that it conveys the risk of eroding human and divine rationality. God and the 
apophatic theology5 as a form of pious adoration of this infinity might have resulted in 
an intellectual dead end. 
 
Cusanus, established a way for the intellectual understanding of the infinity of God 
through the symbolic use of mathematics. Cusanus was deeply influenced by 
Areopagite's apophatic approach and the work of Dionysius, who is the most cited 
author in the writings of Cusanus. He agrees with the Areopagite that God is infinite 
(Cusanus, 1986) and introduces a new thought about this infinity. Cusanus himself calls 
this thought as “never heard before” (prius inaudita). He qualifies the infinity of God 
as the coincidentia oppositorum6, the falling together of contradictions or opposites. 
 
                                                          
5Apophatic theology, also known as negative theology, is a theology that attempts to describe God  by 
negation, to speak of God only in absolutely certain terms and to avoid what may not be said. In Orthodox 
Christianity, apophatic theology is based on the assumption that God's essence is unknowable or ineffable 
and on the recognition of the inadequacy of human language to describe God.  
6The doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum, the interpenetration, interdependence and unification of 
opposites, ( ) 1=¬∧ PPv  has long been one of the defining characteristics of mystical (as opposed to 
philosophical) thought. Mystics of various persuasions have generally held that such paradoxes are the 
best means of expressing within language, truths about a whole that is sundered by the very operation of 
language itself. Any effort, it is said, to analyze these paradoxes and provide them with logical sense is 
doomed from the start because logic itself rests upon assumptions, such as the principles PNC (Principle 
of no contradiction) and PEM (Principle of excluded middle), that are violated by the mystical ideas. The 
coincidentia oppositorum is a common trope in many religious traditions, particularly those with a 
mystical or initiatory aspect (Usó-Doménech, Nescolarde-Selva, Pérez-Gonzaga and Sabán, 2015). 
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Cantor revived the tradition of Cusanus. Although a more comprehensive test would 
also mention Bernardus Bolzano (1781-1848), author of a treatise on paradoxes of 
infinity, and that it was really Georg Cantor who, in the late nineteenth century, realized 
such plurality, laying the foundations of set theory and transfinite numbers. 
 
6.  REFLECTIONS 
 
Infinity was created by an axiom of existence and by a word that is ambiguous. If "there 
is infinity", finite ordinals form a set. Cantor has drawn a line where there is a man 
(infinity), and where there is no man (infinite). He does not stop there: by placing each 
power of infinity, in all parts of a set, he creates the infinite series of the transfinite. 
Without that we can reach a final transfinite, the cardinality of the set of all sets: this is a 
paradoxical set, because according to Russell, it would be a part to the set of the sets 
that do not belong, which either it belong to (and thus do not belong) or does not belong 
(and therefore belongs). 
Transfinite sets have the property of reflexivity: they are coordinatable with parts (the 
integers are coordinatable with squares). How could we know the world if we were not 
coordinatable with it? Because we are so we can create: we can put borders (say no) and 
transgress. And that is because we have been made with border fences, the “nothing”. 
Because we are a one generated by a zero, we are open to infinity. 
The introduction of the notions of infinity in natural or real numbers, or a reference to 
the continuous, should be general epistemological criteria, and theoretical and 
functional requirements. The existence of transfinite wholes does not depend on rules to 
ensure formal consistency, or symbolizations, allowing construction in an algorithmic 
process. Is it also not the case that people can deny transfinite wholes in principle, or 
conversely use them without clear theoretical criteria? The first attitude (simple denial) 
impedes progress in mathematical practice; the second, which is the way that addresses 
logicism, leads to a path full of uncertainty. 
Again the discussion comes to philosophy. Platonism is present in the logicism project 
in a very profound way. The same quantification applies to various wholes without 
providing appropriate criteria for the validity of its introduction. 
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